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Abstract—The paper is a review to evaluate the current
techniques for safety case generation using Model-based Engi-
neering. Safety cases provide an explicit and structured means
for assessing and assuring the safety of complex systems. For
systems developed with Model-based Engineering, safety cases
can be constructed with system models as input and should
evolve hand-in-hand with system models when the system up-
dates. Model-based Engineering can provide automatic means
for the generation to improve efficiency. But there is not a full
automation solution to cover the entire generation process. This
paper investigates state-of-the-art of Model-based Engineering
applications to safety case generation, explores the challenges
and gaps, and proposes a solution framework to address the gaps
through the model transformation within the Eclipse Modeling
Framework.
Keywords-safety case; assurance case; model-based engi-
neering; generation; model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Safety Cases (SC) are defined as compelling arguments,
supported by evidence, that systems operate as intended for
defined applications in defined environments [1]. They pro-
vide a systematic way to argue the safety properties. SCs
are important to the operation of safety-critical systems and
recommended in some safety standards, such as ISO 26262
[2].
Many robotics and autonomous systems are safety-critical,
such as autonomous cars, unmanned aerial vehicles, and
medical robots. Their operational environments are relatively
open and not sufficiently predictable during design. This
may necessitate the system evolution, i.e., the redesign or
replacement of system functions/components, during runtime
at a higher frequency than traditional safety-critical systems.
SCs are constructed alongside the system development
process. One of the issues for SC generation is the repeated
workload from SC evolution due to system development
iteration. Therefore, an automatic way for SC generation and
co-evolution with system design is desired. SCs need to evolve
when the systems are subjected to updates. This evolution is
really an instance of the more general problem of generation,
and so if we tackle the latter, we can more easily tackle the
former. Therefore, We discuss the generation process in the
paper.
In terms of the technical solution for generation automation,
we explore Model-based Engineering (MBE). MBE has been
well-adopted for system development thanks to its efficient
tool support, and its applications have expanded into the
surrounding aspects including SC generation. MBE techniques
bring the capabilities of validation, model checking, simula-
tion, model to model transformations, etc. From the published
work, we can tell that the MBE applications on SC generation
vary in terms of the techniques exploited, the generation
phases applied to, and the extent of automation, etc. However,
there is not an MBE solution to guide the whole engineering
process of SC generation. The purpose of this paper is to
understand the state-of-the-art of MBE applications on SC
generation, to evaluate the automation degree of the solutions,
and to point out the research gaps and the possible research
directions. A new technical solution is proposed at the end to
provide a framework to address the gaps. We only focus on
the work that treats SCs as models, i.e., the whole set of SCs
can be manipulated with MBE techniques.
Section II introduces the main background of the paper.
Section III investigates the state-of-the-art of MBE based
SC generation methods. Section IV evaluates these MBE
solutions, identifies the open gaps, and proposes a new MBE
solution. We conclude in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Safety Case Notations
The widely used SC notations are the structured graphical
forms, including Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [1] and
Claims-Arguments-Evidence (CAE) [3]. Many tools for SC
generation and management are compliant with GSN. But
most of them are not suitable for MBE applications due to
the lack of a model-based foundation.
Structured Assurance Case Meta-Model (SACM) [4] is
a standard for SC development and exchange released by
Object Management Group (OMG). It specifies a metamodel
composed of three concepts: argumentation, artifact, and ter-
minology. SACM can support a variety of notations including
GSN and CAE. SACM version 2.1 was published in 2020. As
a new standard, SACM has little application in industry yet.
However, it enables MBE techniques to be applied to SCs. We
envisage future applications of SACM with possible toolchain
support.
B. Model-based Engineering
To generate and manipulate SCs as models, metamodels
of SC are indispensable. The most prominent modelling
frameworks are the Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF) [5],
offering the metamodelling language Ecore, and the Meta
Object Facility (MOF) [6], a standard metamodelling language
defined by OMG.
III. MODEL-BASED SC GENERATION
A. A common SC generation practice
From a practical point of view, a common SC process is
threefold, as shown in Fig. 1, including SC pattern design,









Fig. 1. A common process for SC generation
The concept of SC pattern is introduced by Kelly in [7].
It is an abstract structure containing placeholders that can
be instantiated by concrete argument elements. For example,
hazards with placeholders {Hazard} in patterns need to be
replaced by the specific hazard content. It is a good practice
for reusing SC structures.
To implement the instantiation, we need to manage the
instantiable data. That is to identify the data required for
SCs, and the relationships between the data elements and also
between the data and SC elements. For example, a regulatory
requirement may require that all hazards are mitigated. Thus,
this requirement and all the hazards are instantiable data
and the traceability between them shall be built. Further, the
regulatory requirements may fit into the top claim of SCs, the
hazards shall be used for lower claims to support the top claim.
The SC process progresses along with system development,
and takes the system data as input, such as regulations,
hazards, safety requirements, architecture, specification and
design, validation and verification plan and results. To feed the
system data into the pattern is the process of instantiation. This
can be either manual or automatic depending on the data form
and the tool support. If the intention is an automatic instanti-
ation by tool, machine-readable instantiation data is required.
Similar to the instantiation process, the data processing can be
either manual or automatic through MBE as well. Based on
the process above, different possibilities to use MBE for SC
generation automation are discussed in the rest of this section.
B. SC generation by pattern instantiation
In this section, we discuss a common way to exploit MBE
in SC generations following the process in Section III-A.
The idea is to generate SC pattern models compliant with a
metamodel, manually build the mapping between instantiable
data and SC pattern nodes, then to instantiate the pattern
automatically through MBE. The method includes following
steps.
Step 1, to build a SC metamodel. This is usually done by
building a GSN-based metamodel, or extending the SACM
metamodel to be compliant with GSN.
Step 2, to design the SC pattern according to the system
nature and create the pattern models using the SC metamodel.
Step 3, to identify and organize the instantiable data as
a data table. The data may include hazards, causes, safety
requirements, system requirements, tests, etc. The data types
and the inter-relationships among data are defined in the table.
The data can be either in a structured or unstructured manner.
Step 4, to manually establish the mapping between the
nodes of SC pattern and the elements of the data tables.
Step 5, to instantiate the pattern models according to the
mapping table of Step 4 and to output the SC models. The
way to instantiate is first to identify the node in the pattern to
be instantiated and the corresponding data for the node from
the mapping table, then to fill the data into the pattern nodes.
The SC pattern is represented as models which allows
the generation of SC models by automatic instantiation, and
the subsequent model management capabilities, e.g., model
validation, model query, and model comparison. However,
since the data mapping table is generated manually, every time
the source data in Step 3 is changed, e.g., a hazard is added or
a safety requirement is deleted, the mapping needs a manual
upgrade. This will bring high workload due to the frequent
system design modifications.
Denney and Pai [8] have developed an automatic tool Advo-
CATE based on this process for SC generation, management,
and evaluation with the Eclipse EMF. The AC metamodel is
created based GSN with a formal syntax. However, this is
not a fully automated process as the logical mapping between
SC nodes and system data are identified manually in the
instantiable data processing phase.
The approach of Hawkins et al. [9] follows the same Step
1 and Step 2 as in [8], but exploits model weaving [10] to
establish the mapping between instantiable data models and
SC pattern models at the metamodel level. Model weaving
is used to build relationships between elements of different
metamodels, and can be realized manually or automatically
by model transformation. The process differs from the method
above in Step 3 to 5 as follows.
Step 3, to identify the instantiable models, such as system
models, system error models.
Step 4, to establish the relationship between the elements
of SC pattern and the elements of the instantiable models at
their metamodel level within a weaving model.
Step 5, to instantiate through the weaving model execution
and to output the SC models. The way to instantiate is first
to identify the elements to be instantiated in the pattern,
then to find the corresponding system model element through
weaving model. For example, the “component goal” in SC
pattern is the “process” element in Architecture Analysis and
Design Language (AADL) models. So, the “process” models
are extracted from the package of the whole system models
and filled into the “component goal” in SCs.
Compared with [8], one of the advantages of the model
weaving method is that the instantiable data can be extracted
from the system models automatically. Secondly, the automatic
co-evolution is enabled because the links between SC elements
and system models are built between the metamodels instead
of specific system data therefore can be updated automatically
when the system design changes.
However, the method is limited to the systems developed
with MBE because the data that has no metamodel supports
cannot be processed by model weaving. We refer to this
kind of data as ”unstructured” in the paper. Also, with the
claims instantiated only by system models, the SC generated
is incomplete. A SC structure usually starts from abstract prop-
erty goal, goes down to the hazards and safety requirements,
and then is related to system models representing functional
requirements and design. Since the first three of data above are
usually unstructured and cannot be processed by MBE directly,
the corresponding claims are not covered by this method.
C. Integrated SC generation by system model query
This method is to generate SC models by system model
query. The query language and the environment are both
integrated with the system development environment. The
query codes for SC generation are generated manually, but
the codes can be reused as a library, thus the co-evolution
of the SC models and system models can be automated. The
method includes the following steps.
Step 1, to design a Domain Specific Language (DSL)
specific to a certain system modelling language for SC claim
generation in a formal manner and for system model query.
Step 2, to formally define the top-level claim using DSL
within the system development environment.
Step 3, to design model query rules for the top-level claim
using DSL, and return the query results as the SC evidence.
The claim formalization and the system query are imple-
mented in the same environment of system modelling. This
allows the tight coupling of SCs with system models and
ensures the automatic consistency of the two when design
changes. Resolute [11] is a DSL designed for creating SCs
for AADL models following the steps above. The limitation is
that the DSL is specific to AADL and not applicable to other
modelling languages. Also, since SCs are highly integrated
with system models, the claims do not involve the unstructured
data including such as hazard and hazard causes, etc. Thus,
the SCs generated are incomplete.
D. SC generation by claim formalization and refinement
In this method, SC claims are formalized as a series of
mathematical assertions about a system model equipped with
a formal semantics. While the system models are refined, the
concrete low level claims are inferred from top level assertion
in parallel. The main benefit of the method is that the inference
from top level to lower level claims can be verified by rigorous
mathematical refinement checking. The method includes three
steps.
Step 1, to formalize the top claim as an assertion “M |= G
under A”, where M is the system model, A is an assumption
on environment, G is the guarantee on system model. This
assertion denotes that the system models satisfy the guarantee
if the assumption is valid.
Step 2, to decompose the top claim by model refinement,
i.e., by refining the system model through system development,
weakening the assumptions, and decomposing or adding guar-
antees. Thus, the lower level claims are inferred as a set of
“M*|= G* under A*” where * means “refined”.
Step 3, to verify the correctness and completeness of the
refinement by Formal Method (FM) verification. This activity
assures the completeness of the SC structure generated through
model refinement in a rigorously mathematical way.
Besides the benefit of the rigorous verification, the in-
tegration of the system models with SC claims supports
the automatic co-evolution of SC whenever system design
changes. However, since the top level claims are usually
abstract, engineering review is a more appropriate way for de-
composition validation, and the formalization and refinement
checking would add no extra value. Additionally, the tight
coupling of SCs with system models requires that both the
SC and system be modelled in a formal way, and this requires
the expertise of formal methods.
Gleirscher et al. [12] proposes this solution and formalize
the claims using differential dynamic logic. The refinement
checking is demonstrated in Isabelle/HOL [13]. Diskin et al.
[14] applied the similar concepts for SC construction using
data refinement. To reduce the need for FM expertise, Block
Diagrams (BD) are used to guide the system model refinement
from the perspective of the system architecture. However, for
the further detailed system implementation, FM expertise is
still unavoidable.
IV. EVALUATION AND PROPOSAL
From Section III, we can see that the SC generation by
automatic pattern instantiation [8] provides a solution for
construction of a complete SC. But the instantiable data
process is not automated. This will bring a high workload of
SC update when system data change. Also, the system model is
not well integrated with SCs. On the other hand, the integration
of the system models into SCs [9] [11] [12] [14] brings
the benefit of automatic co-evolution of the SCs and system
models. However, these system model-based solutions only
create the lower structure of SCs because the upper structure
of SC does not involve the concrete system design but the
unstructured hazard analysis data. Moreover, the model query
[11] provides an automatic traceability from system model to
SCs, but the application is constrained to a certain system
modelling language. The method of claim formalization and
refinement [12] [14] requires FM expertise which may block
the way of the engineering practical application.
To summarize, there is not an automatic solution fully
covering the SC generation process with a wide application
scope. The gaps lie mainly in: (1) a lack of an automatic way
to process the unstructured instantiable data for MBE manip-
ulation; (2) the missing of integration of upper SC structure
derived from hazard analysis and the lower SC structure from
system models; (3) a narrowed scope of applicability to the
system development techniques.
To close the gaps, we propose an SACM compliant frame-
work for SC generation combining the pattern instantiation
based method and system model query based method. The
method is to be applied within the Eclipse EMF framework.
The instantiable data, the system design, and SCs are all
handled as EMF models. For a use case study, RoboChart
[15] is chosen as the system modelling language which is
designed in Eclipse and can be exported as EMF models. The




















Fig. 2. A common process for SC generation
Step 1, the structured data model generation from hazard
analysis result. In order to manipulate the unstructured data
with MBE, we need first to design the unified metamodel in
Ecore for the hazard analysis data in different format, then
convert automatically the unstructured data to the EMF models
through Epsilon Object Language (EOL) [16].
Step 2, to generate upper structure of SCs by instantiation
of EMF models of hazard analysis data. We need to design the
SC pattern according to the system property, and then design
the instantiation rule with Epsilon Transformation Language
(ETL) [16] to link the elements in the SC pattern with the
instantiable EMF models. Here, we refer to the model weaving
method [9]. But we do not need to create a standalone pattern
model as the pattern has been integrated into the instantiation
rule. Also, there is no need to design a specific SC metamodel
as we use SACM as the SC metamodel.
Step 3, to generate the lower structure of SCs by querying
system design models. We refer the model query concept in
[11] in this step. The query rule is designed based on the
property to be argued, and needs to obey the metamodels of
RoboChart and SC, and the SC pattern. The difference from
[11] is that we execute the query in Eclipse instead of a specific
system development environment that is only applicable to
certain system modelling language such as the Open Source
AADL Tool Environment (OSATE) for AADL. This indepen-
dence from the specific system modelling environment will
allow the wider scope of the applicability.
Step 4, the integration of the SC structures. We create and
insert an identifier keyword in the raw data of hazard analysis,
instantiation rule of Step 2, and the query rule of Step 3.
Through this identifier, the position in SC structure where
system model query is required can be automatically identified
and used to link the two parts of the SC structures as a whole.
Our framework can provide an automatic solution cov-
ering the entire SC generation. Compared with Section 3,
our framework may automate the data processing, streamline
the process by removing the pattern modelling and the SC
metamodel design. It also closes the gap by integrating the
SC structures generated from both structured and unstructured
data. The proposal may have a wide scope of applicability
as it can be applied to any system as long as the models
can be converted into EMF models. Moreover, the utilisation
of SACM metamodel instead of GSN-based metamodel may
make our solution compatible with the upcoming SACM based
tools in future.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
SCs are generated and evolve along with the system devel-
opment. The automation of SC process reduces the workload
and chances of errors. We believe MBE is a solution for this
purpose. The paper discusses different MBE methods of SC
generation and the automation capability of each method. The
research gaps are identified as lacking of automatic processing
of raw instantiable data, and of a solution for generating a
complete SC from both structured and unstructured system
data. We propose an SACM compliant framework for SC
generation to close the gap. In future, we will apply our
approach to an autonomous underwater vehicle, and revise the
framework based on the implementation results.
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